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Abstract:  Mark Rowlands’s target article offers a lucid, systematic treatment of a notion of 
personhood that has had significant influence in philosophy. The orthodox interpretation of this 
notion of personhood has been that it requires cognitive capacities not possessed by animals. 
Rowlands disputes this. However, I think his objections to the orthodox, higher-order thought 
(HOT) theories of mental unity may be too quick. In this commentary, I show two separable places 
where Rowlands’s objection to HOT theories of mental unity falls short. 
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Metaphysical personhood is typically understood as meeting two conditions: (1) a mental life that 
is (2) unified. The orthodox view in Western analytic philosophy has long been that non-human 
animals fail to meet one or both of these conditions. Given scientific advances in our 
understanding of non-human animal minds, the contemporary orthodoxy is that non-human 
animals fail the second condition: mental unity. The orthodox view is that mental unity requires 
meta-cognition, a capacity probably not possessed by non-human animals. More specifically, 
mental unity is taken to require reflective self-awareness, which involves taking one’s own body, 
actions, or mental states as the objects of intentional higher-order thoughts (HOTs). Because 
personhood requires mental unity, and mental unity requires HOTs, non-human animals are not 
persons. 
 
Rowlands rejects the orthodox view just rehearsed. Rowlands has written effectively against 
theories that appeal to HOTs, characterizing them as being motivated by “magical thinking” or as 
relying on the “miracle-of-the-meta.”i In the case of appealing to HOTs to account for mental 
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unity, Rowlands (2016) writes, “Not only is reflective self-awareness unnecessary for personhood, 
it can, in fact, never be the basis of personhood” (p. 12).  
 
In this commentary, I offer two distinct arguments suggesting that Rowlands’s objection to HOT 
theories of mental unity is unsuccessful.  
 
2. Rowlands’s Argument 
 
Rowlands’s objection to the orthodox appeal to HOTs to account for mental unity runs as follows. 
Accounting for the unity of a series of first-order thoughts by appealing to a second-order thought 
simply pushes the matter back by introducing the question of how that second-order thought is 
unified with the first-order thoughts.ii The obvious way to account for the unity of a given second-
order thought with the first-order thoughts it allegedly unifies is to appeal to the fact that the 
former is about each of the latter. But Rowlands argues that this cannot work, because it 
presupposes precisely the unity for which it is intended to account.  
 
To illustrate his objection, Rowlands introduces a series of first-order thoughts, a1, a2, a3, … an, 
which he calls the A-series, and a second series of first-order thoughts that he refers to as the B-
series. It could be that both series belong to the same thinker or that they belong to two different 
thinkers. On the theory under consideration, a given HOT unifies and is unified with the A-series 
and not with the B-series because it is about the A-series and not about the B-series. Rowlands 
(2016) objects to this, writing, “The claim that [the HOT] is about members of the A series and not 
the B series presupposes that A and B series are distinct series of mental states and processes” 
(p. 14). The problem with this presupposition of distinctness is that we cannot make sense of the 
notion of distinctness without having the notion of unity, which is precisely what we are trying to 
account for. So, the orthodox HOT theory of mental unity fails because it presupposes the unity 
it is meant to explain. 
  
I offer two responses to Rowlands’s objection. The first is that his objection trades on a conflation 
of two notions of unity, and therefore if there is any presupposition of unity at play, it is not an 
illegitimate presupposition. The second is that there is in fact no presupposition at all, and a 
fortiori, no illegitimate presupposition. 
 
2.1. An Objectively HOT Approach 
 
Consider the contents of a bag. They are unified by the bag in a sense that we can call unity1. 
Contrast this with the threads of your shirt. They are unified by the act of sewing in a sense we 
can call unity2. Rowlands’s argument against HOT theories of mental unity conflates these two 
notions of unity. He argues that a HOT cannot account for the unity of the members of the A-
series of thoughts without presupposing that the A-series is distinct from the B-series and 
therefore that the A-series is unified, which is precisely what is meant to be accounted for. But 
the sort of unity presupposed by claiming that a HOT is about the A-series and not about the B-
series is merely the sort of unity involved in distinguishing one set of things from another set of 
things. That is a different, much less demanding sort of unity from the unity at stake in the matter 
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of personhood. The unity at stake in personhood — mental unity — is a more akin to the unity of 
threads and cloth that have been sewn together. The unity at stake in merely distinguishing one 
set of things from another set of things is the sort of unity provided by a bag or a box to whatever 
its contents are. 
 
If I am right, then a proponent of HOT can appeal to an objective basis, such as being generated 
by the same physical structure (e.g., a brain) to unify1 the first order mental states and the 
corresponding HOT. Then, they can appeal to the fact that the HOT is about the first-order mental 
states to account for the unity2 of the first-order mental states and the HOT. Appealing to the HOT 
to provide unity2 of the first-order mental states will not wrongly presuppose unity of those states, 
because it merely presupposes unity1, which is established by the common physical structure that 
generated the states, whereas unity2 is the phenomenon being accounted for by the appeal to 
HOTs. 
 
2.2. Facts vs. Claims 
 
My first response to Rowlands’s objection to the orthodox HOT theory of mental unity assumes 
that Rowlands was right in claiming that a presupposition of unity is made by the orthodox view. 
I did not contest that a presupposition is made, but rather showed that the presupposition that 
Rowlands’s objection trades on is not problematic. Here, I go on to suggest that there is in fact no 
presupposition at all, and a fortiori no problematic presupposition. 
 
As quoted above, Rowlands writes, “The claim that [the HOT] is about members of the A series 
and not the B series presupposes that A and B series are distinct series of mental states and 
processes” (p. 14). But I don’t see this at all; I don’t understand the objection.  
 
We could take Rowlands’s assertion at face value and assume that when he uses the term 
“claims,” which he does consistently in the section of his article dealing with this objection, he 
really means “claims.”iii But we are concerned with the fact of whether a HOT is about some-or-
other first-order thoughts, rather than with a claim to that effect. In asserting that HOTs account 
for mental unity, the assertion is that, in fact, a given HOT takes as its object various other mental 
states. If that fact is true, it serves as the truth-maker for the claim that the HOT is about the other 
mental states. Because the fact is logically prior to the claim, and because the HOT theory of 
mental unity requires facts, not claims, and because Rowlands’s objection to the HOT theory of 
mental unity alleges that the claim presupposes the fact, Rowlands’s objection to HOT theories 
of mental unity seems to fail.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
I have argued that Rowlands’s objection to HOT theories of mental unity fails. It does not follow, 
however, that HOT theories of mental unity are correct, or even that they are superior to 
Rowlands’s proposed alternative. Indeed, I agree with Rowlands that HOT theories of mental unity 
are almost certainly wrong. Consider an entity that intelligently navigates its environment, 
experiences sensory perceptions, sensory sensations, and emotions, and has memories of all of 
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these things. It stretches credulity beyond breaking to assert that such a being, in the absence of 
higher-order thoughts and the capacity for reflective self-awareness, is not a metaphysical person 
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